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A neural network model is presented to account for the three dimensional perception of 
visual space by way of an analog Gestalt-like perceptual mechanism. 
The Gestalt movement has revealed certain powerful perceptual interactions that take place 
between elements in tbe visual world, and that these interactions are preattentive, or unaffected by 
conscious thoughts, suggesting that tbese phenomena represent fundamental computational mech-
anisms of tbe lower levels of the visual system. The Gestalt modelers attempted to characterize 
such interactions using models of field-like interactions between inducing elements. A favorite 
mechanism proposed by the early Gestalt theorists is the soap bubble analogy. The beauty of the 
soap bubble is tbat it computes a perfect geometrical shape through local interactions along the 
surface. Unlike an abstract geometrical representation of a sphere however, the bubble is flexible 
and adaptive, bending every point on its surface in response to external forces. The beauty of the 
notion of simple local interactions in spatial perception is that simple laws do not necessarily 
result in simple percepts. For example the mathematical shape of a bubble can become very com-
plex while it is being blown, even though the forces responsible for that shape are the same simple 
forces responsible for the perfect spherical bubble. A good example of bubble-like perceptual 
laws is the phenomenon of illusory boundaries as shown in Figure 1 . 
Figure 1. 
Three dimensional Kanisza square illusion. 
A more modern model of illusory boundary formation is presented by the Boundary Contour Sys-
tem (BCS) of Grossberg and Mingolla [1]. This is a neurophysiological model, i.e. it is expressed 
in terms of interactions between model neural elements by way of spatial receptive fields, and yet 
it is motivated by psychophysical phenomena such as tbe Kanisza figures, and indeed the BCS has 
been shown capable of reproducing illusory boundaries when given such figures as input. The 
mechanism in the BCS model that is responsible for illusory boundary formation is illustrated in 
Figure 2. In this model, oriented edge sensitive cells such as cells (a) and (b) in tbe figure fire in 
response to local oriented edges. A higher level cooperative cell (d), which represents extended 
Figure 2. 
Illusory boundary completion in the BCS model by way of bipolar receptive field of the coop-
erative cell. 
horizontal edges, receives input from local edge cells (a) and (c) and sends a feedback signal back 
down to cell (b), causing it to fire weakly as if in response to a weak horizontal boundary. The 
cooperative cell therefore responds only to pairs of oriented signals that are both parallel to each 
other and spatially aligned, as if part of the same boundary. A certain spatial and orientational 
uncertainty is built in to the definition of the cooperative cell's recepive field to allow it to respond 
to inputs that are slightly mis-aligned in either location or orientation, although such response is 
somewhat attenuated by the mis-alignment. This kind of mechanism is an embodiment of the 
Gestalt field-like theories in a form consistent with modem knowledge about neurophysiology, 
the field-like interactions between visual elements being implemented by the field-like patterns 
defined in the neural receptive fields. As a result, this model exhibits the dynamic field-like prop-
erties of the soap bubble type Gestalt model in a modem physiologically plausible form. 
The phenomenon of illusory boundary formation is fundamentally three dimensional however, as 
can be seen by viewing Figure 1 as a stereo pair, which produces the three dimensional percept 
sketched to the right in the figure. In order to fully account for these phenomena, a three dimen-
sional extension must be added to a BCS-like model. Given that the brain must represent three 
dimensional space, what kind of mechanism could it possibly employ? There are two alternative 
ways to represent space, which I will call the vector and the matrix representations. In a vector 
representation, objects in space are located by their coordinates, for example x, y, z vectors. Every 
object must have it's own vector entry, and empty spaces between objects are not represented. In 
the matrix representation the space is represented explicitly by a matrix of cells, and objects in 
that space are encoded by a change in state of those cells. In a matrix representation, the whole 
space is represented at all times, whether or not there is anything in that space. Figure 3 illustrates 
this principle. The dichotomy between these two alternatives is fundamental to the nature of spa-
tial representation, and can be reduced more generally to a choice between representing the space 
itself versus representing the objects in that space. All spatial representations must consist of one 
or another of these two alternatives, or some combination of them. 
Since the BCS model performs illusory boundary completion across featureless space, that per-
ceptually empty space must be represented explicitly in order to allow for such completion. 
Indeed, it is for this very reason that the two dimensional BCS model makes use of a two dimen-
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Figure 3. 
Two alternative representations of three dimensional information. 
siona1 matrix representation in just that manner. The matrix representation has several serious pit-
falls however as a representation in the brain. How is the essentially infinite space of the external 
world to be represented in a finite matrix in the brain? Cartesian space is by definition an 
unbounded space defined as x,y,z distances from some origin. Mathematically, distances are 
equally represented at any distance from the origin, and an object can be defined in this space at 
any distance from zero to infinity. Perceptual space however has very different properties. Dis-
tances that are nearby are represented with much greater acuity than distances that are far away, 
and indeed there is a maximum distance beyond which all things appear to be pasted on a sphere 
of equal distance from the observer. For example the sun, moon, stars, and distant mountains all 
appear to be at the same distance from the observer, i.e. very far away. The vast difference 
between the distance to the sun and the distance to the moon, measured in millions of miles, 
dwarfs the tiny distance from the observer to the mountains, and yet the observer perceives a great 
distance to the mountain and a small distance between the mountains and the moon. There is no 
perceptual disparity between the distance to the moon and the vastly greater distance to the sun, or 
the even further stars. 
I propose therefore a coordinate system of azimuth, elevation, and vergence in a matrix represen-
tation of space as the physiological substrate that accounts for the perception of space. The choice 
of vergence to represent depth is guided by three factors- first, that vergence information is avail-
able to the visual system directly from the two eyes, and there is neurophysiological evidence that 
such a representation exists at least at the primary visual cortex, where the left and right eye visual 
pathways are carefully interleaved. Secondly, this representation has the non-Euclidean properties 
observed in perceptual space, i.e. that the representation loses resolution with distance from the 
origin. Finally, this representation has the great physiological advantage of being able to represent 
an infinite space in a finite representation, with the additional ecological advantage that the most 
important part of space, that closest to the observer, is represented in much greater resolution and 
geometrical fidelity than the least important space, that most distant from the observer. The two 
other dimensions, azimuth and elevation, being also bounded, allows a mapping from the infinite 
Cartesian space to the finite perceptual space in a finite three dimensional matrix representation. 
Figure 4 illustrates this type of perceptual mechanism in a spherical volume of neural tissue, 
where the activation of that tissue represents visual edges and features in the surrounding space. 
3 
Figure 4. 
Properties of azimuth I elevation I vergence representation- mapping from body surface to 
infinity (A); colinearity relations; spherical mapping in a fiat cortex (B); 
The Euclidean definition of colinearity must be transformed in this representation into a pattern 
resembling (B), where the shaded curves in the azimuth/elevation/vergence space represent 
straight lines in Euclidean space. Colinearity detectors in such a system would therefore be like-
wise distorted, as indicated by the stars at the intersections, which represent families of coopera-
tive cells as defined in the BCS at different orientations in the space. Such a mechanism would 
tend to perform boundary completion along the curved lines in the representation, producing a 
percept of parallel lines. For example, the road in Figure 4 is seen as locally parallel lines which 
nevertheless converge to a point both ahead of and behind the observer. Geometrically, this should 
be paradoxical. However, since these lines follow the grain of the neural connections in the per-
ceptual representation, they lead to a subjective percept of parallel lines stretching to infinity. 
Notice the near Euclidean nature of the representation within the central bulging square in (B). 
Although this mechanism must be computationally spherical, the physical mechanism may be 
quite different. For instance the sphere in (A) may be opened at the back and stretched into a flat 
sheet, as shown in (C), which now looks much more like the representation at the visual cortex. 
The entire periphery of this sheet represents the single point directly behind, and depth of the 
sheet represents the full range of distance from the body surface to infinity, although the represen-
tation of this dimension in the cortex would be in the form of vergence rather than spatial thick-
ness. 
This model suggests that the visual system performs two completely separate functions; the first is 
to generate and maintain a high resolution internal copy of external space based on low level 
visual features, and the second is to abstract elements of that representation for recognition and 
recall. While it is the second function that has received the most attention from visual scientists, it 
is the first that is by far the more remarkable in terms of computational complexity, and indispen-
sible for behavioral interaction with the world. Indeed a failure in the first system, as represented 
by left hemianopia, is far more crippling a disability than a failure of the second system, as in 
associative agnosia. 
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